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This paper examines an environment where money is essential and agents exchange
in perfectly-competitive, Walrasian markets. Agents consume and produce a homo-
geneous good, but hold money to purchase consumption in the event of a relatively
low productivity shock. A Walrasian market delivers a non-degenerate distribution of
money holdings across agents and avoids some of the computational di¢ culties asso-
ciated with the market and pricing assumptions of bilateral matching and bargaining
common to search-theoretic environments. The model is calibrated to long-run US
velocity, and the welfare costs of in￿ ation are assessed for variable buyer-seller ratios
and persistent states of buying and selling.
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A large subset of the monetary theory literature stresses the microfoundations for mak-
ing the holding and use of money essential.1 The earliest versions of these environments (e.g.
Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) restrict money holdings to be indivisible, rendering them too
simplistic for rigorous quantitative analyses. The reason for such a restriction was that if
agents were allowed to hold any amount of money, then the distribution of money holdings
across agents would become too complicated of an object to handle. This problem is avoided
in subsequent environments (e.g. Shi, 1997 and Lagos and Wright, 2005) through assump-
tions which render the distribution of money holdings degenerate. While an improvement in
quantitative applicability, the assumptions making these models tractable are the same that
make them unsuitable for studying the distributional e⁄ects of monetary policy.
Studying the distributional e⁄ects of monetary policy is di¢ cult in search-theoretic en-
vironments because the assumed terms of trade is bilateral bargaining. With bilateral bar-
gaining, the distribution of money holdings is an endogenous state variable because the
probability of matching with a relatively wealthy or poor agent in￿ uences an agent￿ s present
money holdings.2 Assessing any distributional e⁄ects of monetary policy in models assuming
bilateral bargaining therefore comes with a large computational cost. For example, Molico
(2006) quantitatively assesses an environment similar to Trejos and Wright (1995) only allows
agents to hold perfectly divisible money, and Chiu and Molico (2009) assess the Lagos-Wright
model without the assumptions rendering the monetary distribution degenerate. While show-
ing that interesting policy analyses can be gained by facing these computational di¢ culties
head on, the potential for extensions appear formidable.
The goal of this paper is to establish and quantitatively assess an environment where
money is essential while avoiding the computational di¢ culties associated with bilateral
1In general, the essentiallity of money requires an environment with spatial, temporal, or informational
frictions which results in the set of allocations supported with money being larger (and possibly better) than
without it.
2Examples are Green and Zhou (1998, 2002), Camera and Corbae (1999), Zhou (1999), and Zhu (2003,
2005).
2matching and bargaining. Instead of the common assumptions of a pair-wise match followed
by a bargaining phase, the model studied here assumes all agents meet in a single (centralized)
Walrasian market and take a competitively-determined price as given. Agents receive a shock
every period a⁄ecting their desire to consume and their ability to produce a homogeneous
consumption good. An important distinction from previous search-theoretic environments
is that all agents must consume and will be able to produce, but agents may di⁄er due
to their productivities and preferences. All agents are granted access to the market, and
agents who wish to produce can trade as much of the good as they want against the market.
Agents who do not wish to produce must ￿nd another way of obtaining consumption, and
the assumption of anonymity precludes the use of credit. All agents therefore hold money
balances to self-insure against liquidity shocks (i.e. the event they receive a shock negatively
a⁄ecting their ability to produce).
Assuming Walrasian markets deliver rather signi￿cant methodological contributions. Agents
no longer need to anticipate who they meet because they trade against the market and take
the single market-clearing price as given. The endogenous (and non-degenerate) distribution
of money holdings delivered by the model is no longer an endogenous state variable, and the
analysis therefore shows that a model with essential money can be analyzed with a computa-
tional di¢ culty on par with early heterogeneous-agent economies such as Huggett (1993) and
Aiyagari (1994).3 In addition, assuming all agents consume allows the model to be calibrated
to match important empirical features such as long-run US velocity. Calibrating models to
velocity was previously thought to require an additional (centralized) market where agent￿ s
engage in non-monetary consumption as in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Chiu and Molico
(2009).4 Since the only market here is centralized, monetary and non-monetary trade can
be conducted concurrently. Finally, the ￿ exibility of the Walrasian market allows for a rich
3The important distinction between these environments and the one studied here is that the endogenous
state variable (￿at money) is solely produced by the monetary authority and therefore responds to policy in
a di⁄erent way than privately-issued debt or capital.
4Matching velocity in an environments where all consumption is assumed monetary is not possible (e.g.
Molico, 2006). With a ￿xed stock of money, there is a negative relationship between prices and quantity
which delivers a monetary velocity below empirical observations.
3set of alternative environments to assess the welfare implications of monetary policy. Since
agents are no longer required to match in bilateral pairs, the analysis considers monetary
equilibria with buyer-seller ratios other than one as well as persistent states of buying and
selling.
Following the monetary-search literature, the model is quantitatively evaluated by com-
paring the long-run e⁄ects of in￿ ation where prices and the distribution of money holdings
are stationary. The results indicate that prices, monetary velocity, and the dispersion of the
monetary distribution are all increasing in the money growth (in￿ ation) rate for any buyer-
seller ratio. The welfare costs of in￿ ation are calculated in a consumption-equivalent manner
similar to search-based analyses. When the buyer-seller ratio is equal to one, for example,
the model predicts that going from 10 percent in￿ ation to 0 is worth 0.924 percent of total
consumption. Additional results indicate that prices are decreasing and welfare costs are
increasing in the buyer-seller ratio. With a buyer-seller ratio of 5, for example, the cost of 10
percent in￿ ation is worth 1.231 percent of total consumption. Interestingly, this version of
the model with the highest welfare costs has a monetary distribution which closely matches
features of the empirical monetary distribution in the US. Finally, when shocks are persis-
tent, prices and welfare costs are decreasing in the (symmetric) degree of persistence. For
example, when high or low productivity agents have a 25 percent chance of being the same
next period, the average cost of 10 percent in￿ ation is 2.169 percent of total consumption.
When agents receive a 90 percent chance, the average welfare gain of 10 percent in￿ ation is
1.990 percent. These welfare results are decomposed across sellers and buyers to show that
the gains / costs of in￿ ation are unevenly distributed among those in persistent states of
buying or selling. Clearly, agents in a persistent state of spending money would bene￿t from
high monetary transfers and relatively high in￿ ation, while agents in a persistent state of
receiving money would bene￿t from relatively low in￿ ation.
There are also economically relevant reasons to assume competitive price-taking as an
alternative to bilateral bargaining. Competitive pricing with essential money holdings has
4been explored in overlapping generations models by Wallace (1980), turnpike models by
Townsend (1980), and many others. More recently, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider
competitive pricing in a version of the Lagos and Wright model and show that di⁄erent
market structures have di⁄erent implications for the nature of equilibrium and for the e⁄ects
of policy.5 Therefore, alternative market assumptions when studying monetary policy is just
as important as alternative markets in the labor literature. If quantitative analysis of Molico
(2006) is monetary economics￿analog to the bargaining model of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), then the present analysis is monetary economics￿analog to the price-taking model
of Lucas and Prescott (1974).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
de￿nes and equilibrium. Section 3 outlines the computational algorithm, states the assumed
functional forms and calibrations, and details the numerical results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The Environment
Time is discrete with an in￿nite horizon. There exists a [0;1] continuum of in￿nitely-
lived agents who discount the future at rate ￿ 2 (0;1). All agents consume and produce
a perfectly divisible and non-storable good. At the beginning of every period, each agent
receives a shock identifying them as one of two possible types. Let the set of agent types be
E = fb;sg. If e = b; the agent receives a relatively low productivity shock. If e = s; the
agent receives a relatively high preference shock.6 In general, preferences are given by
U (x;y;e) = u(x;e) ￿ c(y;e); (1)
5However, Rocheteau and Wright still maintain the assumptions of Lagos and Wright which deliver a
degenerate monetary distribution.
6This shock could be modeled as separate shocks to preferences and productivity which are assumed to
be perfectly correlated. It will be shown that this assumption allows the model to match velocity for an
arbitrary number of each type of agent. An exercise below shows that preference shocks can be removed and
the model can be calibrated by pinning down the population of agent types.
5where x and y denote consumption and production of the good. Assume that u and c are
C2 and strictly increasing, with u00 < 0 and c00 ￿ 0: Also, u(0;e) = ￿1; u0 (0;e) = 1; and
c(0;e) = 0 8e 2 E: A relatively low productivity shock implies c(y;b) > c(y;s) 8y > 0
and c0 (￿;b) > c0 (￿;s); while a relatively high preference shock implies u(x;s) > u(x;b)
8x > 0 and u0 (￿;s) > u0(￿;b): The shock follows a Markov process with stationary transition
probability ￿ (e0je) = Pr(et+1 = e0jet = e) > 0 8e0;e 2 E that is iid across agents.
There exists a stock of ￿at money which is perfectly divisible, costlessly storable, and
cannot be produced or consumed by any private individual. Let ^ MT denote the beginning-
of-period money stock, which grows at a constant rate ￿ ￿ 0: The law of motion is given
by ^ MT0 = (1 + ￿) ^ MT; where ^ MT0 denotes the stock of money available next period. Agents
can hold any nonnegative amount of money (^ me 2 R+); and new money is injected into
the environment via identical lump-sum transfers ￿ to all agents at the beginning of every
period.
Agents are granted access to a centralized market after their types are known. Although
there is a single consumption good which can be produced by all agents, type b agents
may want to consume more than what they wish to produce while type s agents may want
to produce more than they wish to consume. In addition, all agents are assumed to be
anonymous, which precludes the availability of credit and generates an essential role for
money as a medium of exchange.7
Let ^ P > 0 denote the nominal price of consumption in the market which all agents take
as given. Since the market is Walrasian, agents meet concurrently and trade as much as
desired against the market. Let V
￿
^ m;e; ^ P
￿
be the expected lifetime utility of a type e
agent at the end of a period holding money balances ^ m at price ^ P. The decision problem of
7These conditions are maintained by Levin (1991), Kocherlakota (1998), and Rocheteau and Wright
(2005).
6this agent is given by
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e0 ￿ ^ P (ye0 ￿ xe0) ￿ ^ m + ￿: (3)
The period budget constraint (3) applies for all agents, but the choices of ye0 and xe0 will
depend on an agent￿ s type. In general, a type b agent with a relatively low productivity
shock will choose xb > yb making her a (net) buyer, while a type s agent will choose ys > xs
making her a (net) seller. Buyer￿ s will therefore deplete their present money balances while
sellers will replenish and self-insure against a future low productivity shock.
It should be noted that having sellers consume is motivated by needing an amount of
consumption being non-monetary. In other words, consumption by a seller (xs) can equally
be interpreted as consumption of their own production or simple one-for-one trades with
other sellers.8 Since these exchanges do not involve money, the preference shock allows
the model to match important features of an economy like velocity by keeping output high
without placing downward pressure on prices.
2.2. Equilibrium
All nominal variables are expressed as fractions of the total end-of-period money stock
￿
e.g. P = ^ P= ^ MT0 and m0 = ^ m0= ^ MT0
￿
. While the short-run dynamics of this economy are
certainly of interest, the present analysis focuses on stationary equilibria where the (normal-
ized) price of consumption P and the distribution of money holdings remain constant. In
other words, this analysis focuses on the long-run e⁄ects of changes in the constant money
8One can argue that the same types of exchanges take place in the centralized markets of search-theoretic
monetary models (i.e. Lagos and Wright, 2005).
7growth rate ￿:
At the end of every period, agents will be heterogeneous with respect to their type (e)
and individual money holdings (m): Agents can be described by their individual state vector
z 2 Z, where z = (m;e). The individual state space is de￿ned as Z = M￿E; where M = R+:
Let   be a probability measure on (S;￿S); where S = R+￿E and ￿S is the Borel ￿-algebra.
For B 2 ￿S, one can think of   (B) as the mass of agents with money holdings and types in
the set B when the good price is P and the money growth rate is ￿:
With the agents￿decision rules and the shock process, a transition function ￿ : R+￿E !
[0;1] can be constructed. ￿(z;B) describes the conditional probability that an agent with
state z will have an individual state vector lying in B next period. Therefore, a stationary
probability measure de￿ned on (S;￿S) must satisfy
  (B) =
Z
S
￿(z;B)d ; 8B 2 ￿S: (4)
A stationary equilibrium is a list of functions V (z;P); m(z;P); x(z;P); y (z;P); a
probability measure  ; and a market price P (￿) such that
1. m(z;P); x(z;P); and y (z;P) are optimal decision rules given P (￿):
2.   is a stationary probability measure.
3. The markets for goods and money clear:
Z
S
[x(z;P) ￿ y (z;P)]d  = 0 (5)
Z
S
m(z;P)d  = 1 (6)
The goods market clearing condition (5) states that the total amount of output produced
must equal the total consumed, while the money market clearing condition (6) states that
the total amount of money held must be equal to the (normalized) available money stock.
83. Numerical Analysis
3.1. The Computational Algorithm
As stated in the introduction, the single market-clearing price delivered by Walrasian
markets greatly eases the computational burden of solving for a stationary distribution of
money holdings. The algorithm for solving the economy presented here only departs from
the algorithm of Huggett (1993) insofar as there are two market clearing conditions (goods
and money).
The computational algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Given MT = 1 (normalized monetary base), de￿ne a grid on the space of money
holdings, f0;m1;m2;:::; ￿ mg, where ￿ m is large enough so there is no mass of agents
with money holdings m ￿ ￿ m for any probability density satisfying
R
Smd  = 1:9
2. Given a money growth rate ￿; select an initial price P0 and solve V (z;P0) using (2).




md 0 = 1;
and draw a large sample (size N) from this distribution.10
4. Using the decision rules from step 2, update the sample of money holdings until the
probability measure has converged. Namely, randomly select agents to become buyers
and sellers based on the Markov process, and update each individual￿ s money holdings
using m(z;P) until convergence is achieved.11
5. Given the converged probability measure, compute the goods market-clearing condition
(5):
R
S [x(z;P) ￿ y (z;P)]d  = ￿:
9The numerical exercises used ￿ m = 4:
10The numerical exercises used a population size of 60,000 - 100,000 agents depending on the population
of each type assumed. The initial distribution of money has no in￿ uence on the converged distributions.
11Piecewise cubic-hermite interpolation was employed for all function evaluations between the grid points.
9￿ If ￿ ￿ 0; stop.12
￿ If ￿ > 0; then excess demand for goods implies the market price is too low to clear
the market. Choose P1 > P0 and repeat steps 2-5.
￿ If ￿ < 0; then excess supply for goods implies the market price is too high. Choose
P1 < P0 and repeat steps 2-5.
One detail worth noting is that the money market-clearing condition (6) is used for each
updating of the monetary distribution in step 4. For example, consider an arbitrary price
above the market-clearing price. At this price, sellers supply more to the market than buyers
demand, implying that sellers will have increased their money holdings more than what
buyers have decreased after every iteration. The total stock of money is therefore increasing
and the distribution of money holdings is fanning out. This is prevented by imposing (6) at
each update of the distribution. After trades have taken place, subtract the total amount
of money accepted from the amount spent and denote this as ~ M: If ~ M > 0; then the price
is below market clearing and sellers accepted less money than buyers spent and the balance
is equally distributed to all buyers end-of-period money holdings. Conversely, if ~ M < 0;
then the price is above market clearing and the balance is equally debited from all sellers
end-of-period money holdings. This procedure preserves the initial money stock, and once
the distribution has converged, step 5 delivers guidance on a new price so (5) and (6) are
satis￿ed simultaneously.
12All numerical exercises used a tolerance of j￿j ￿ 0:001:
103.2. Functional Forms and Calibration
The preferences considered here are similar to those considered by Lagos and Wright
(2005) and subsequent others for their centralized markets. The functional forms are:
u(x;e) = ￿e log(x)
c(y;e) = Cey;
with ￿s > ￿b and Cb > Cs: Stated previously, values of ￿e and Ce serve the same purpose
here as di⁄erent utility functions across markets in search-based models; it allows the model
to match monetary velocity.
The benchmark economy assumes an annual frequency, and ￿ is set to 0.96 corresponding
to a four percent real annual interest rate. Type shocks are assumed to have no persistence,
implying all agents face an equal probability of becoming a type e agent next period. De￿ning
￿ (bje) = ￿ and ￿ (sje) = 1 ￿ ￿ 8e 2 E; the resulting buyer-seller ratio is ￿=(1 ￿ ￿): The
benchmark economy assumes a buyer-seller ratio of one and sets ￿ = 1=2:
For all exercises considered, ￿b = 1; Cs = 1; and Cb is set large enough to ensure that the
production of type b agent does not greatly in￿ uence the numerical results (Cb = 1:0e3).13
The amount a seller is willing to consume (i.e. non-monetary consumption) depends on the
preference parameter ￿s: For ￿ = 1=2; ￿s is calibrated to 18:15 so the predicted monetary
velocity is roughly 5 when the annual money growth rate is 2 percent. This empirical measure
of velocity follows Lagos and Wright (2005) and Molico and Chiu (2009) by using M1 as the
monetary aggregate.
Before proceeding to the numerical results, it should be noted that the preference shock
parameter ￿s is not a crucial feature of the economy. This parameter is pinned down to
match velocity while the probability of becoming a buyer (￿) can remain a free parameter.
13When a type b agent has zero money holdings, she has no alternative but to produce for herself. She
will therefore choose a quantity q such that the marginal cost of production equals the marginal bene￿t:
q = ￿b=Cb: Since this is a low probability event, the numerical results are robust to the choice of Cb:
11When ￿ is free, it allows the analysis to consider alternative buyer-seller ratios. A version of
the model is considered below where ￿s = 1 and ￿ is pinned down to match velocity.
3.3. Numerical Results
3.3.1. The Benchmark Economy
The results for the benchmark model with zero in￿ ation (￿ = 0) are illustrated in Figure
1. The value function (upper-left panel) indicates that the marginal value of money is
decreasing in the amount of money holdings, implying there are declining incentives for self-
insurance once an agent becomes wealthy.14 The amount a seller produces (ys) is decreasing
in her money holdings, while the amount of consumption (xs) is constant and equal to ￿s.
Due to the quasi-linear preferences considered, all sellers choose consumption such that the
marginal bene￿t of consumption (￿s=xs) is equal to the marginal cost of production (1). In
other words, all sellers behave like agents in the centralized market of Lagos and Wright.
The same cannot be said for buyers, who instead use their money balances to purchase
consumption from sellers.
To understand the results further, note that the value ys ￿ xs becomes negative at a
particular amount of monetary wealth. Denote this amount m￿: Sellers with m￿ choose to
consume or trade their production and make no changes to their money holdings, while sellers
with less (more) than m￿ produce more (less) to replenish (deplete) their money balances.
Therefore, all sellers choose m￿: The lower-right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the stationary
monetary distribution. The distribution indicates that 50 percent of the population hold m￿;
clearly due to the fact that 50 percent of the population are sellers at any given time. The
remaining mass points comprise the rest of the population who have been buyers for one or
more periods. Therefore, the liquidity constraints of the buyers deliver the non-degenerate
distribution.
14It should be noted that only one value function is illustrated because when type shocks have no persis-
tence: V (m;b;P) = V (m;s;P) 8m 2 M:
12The analysis now turns to the welfare e⁄ects of long-run in￿ ation. De￿ne W (0) as the
average-expected welfare of all agents in an environment with zero in￿ ation.
W (0) =
R






[￿U (x;y;b) + (1 ￿ ￿)U (x;y;s)]d  (0)
Given this measure, the welfare cost of having an in￿ ation rate greater than zero is given by






[￿U (￿(￿)x;y;b) + (1 ￿ ￿)U (￿(￿)x;y;s)]d  (￿): (8)
In other words, ￿(￿) delivers the compensation (in terms of consumption) that agents would
need under in￿ ation rate ￿ to be just as well o⁄ as they were under zero in￿ ation.
The welfare calculations and a variety of other statistics are reported in Table 1. In
general, increasing in￿ ation results in an increase in the market price, the dispersion of money
holdings, and monetary velocity, as well as a decrease in the average amount consumed by
buyers and welfare. The increase in prices and velocity are due to the fact that under larger
amounts of in￿ ation, relatively poor buyers are given subsidies of money and now have
additional funds with which to demand more consumption. These anticipated subsidies
induce buyers to spend more of their present money balances, but induce sellers to o⁄er
fewer goods. This results in a more dispersed monetary distribution and delivers the overall
decline in welfare. In particular, an agent under 10 percent in￿ ation relative to zero percent
would su⁄er a cost of roughly 0.92 percent of total consumption.
To further illustrate the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on the benchmark economy, the monetary
distributions under several in￿ ation rates are illustrated in Figure 2. All distributions exhibit
a right-tail where 50 percent of the population hold m￿ (￿); but m￿ (￿) is increasing in the
in￿ ation rate. In addition, the distance between the mass points for the remaining buyers
are also increasing in the in￿ ation rate due to the increasing good price. Buyers spend larger
























































































































Figure 1: Benchmark economy under zero percent in￿ ation.
portions of their money balances after each successive period of buying.
3.3.2. Variable Buyer-Seller Ratios
The analysis now considers the model under di⁄erent buyer-seller ratios. Type shocks
are still assumed to have no persistence (￿ (bje) = ￿; 8e 2 E). Recalling that the buyer-
seller ratio is ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), any buyer-seller ratio can be achieved by altering the probability
of receiving a type b shock.
Four alternative buyer-seller ratios are considered. Ratios of 1=2 and 2 were arbitrarily
chosen to compare against the benchmark case. The other two ratios were chosen to illus-
trate important features of the model. First, a buyer-seller ratio of 5 delivers a monetary




























































































Figure 2: Monetary distributions for benchmark economy; variable in￿ ation rates.
15Table 1: Numerical results for benchmark economy
￿ (% ann.) P std(m) Velocity E (xb) E (xs) Welfare (%)
0 0.388 0.364 3.741 0.782 18.50 0
0:5 0.423 0.384 4.078 0.765 18.50 0.055
1:0 0.458 0.403 4.408 0.749 18.50 0.115
2:0 0.524 0.436 5.034 0.720 18.50 0.232
5:0 0.696 0.506 6.660 0.652 18.50 0.508
10:0 0.974 0.594 9.285 0.567 18.50 0.924
distribution which matches features of an empirical proxy for the monetary distribution in
the US. Second, a buyer-seller ratio of 0.0154 allows the model to drop the preference shock
(i.e. ￿s = 1) by using ￿ to calibrate the model to the same velocity measure as the bench-
mark economy. For the other three versions of the model, ￿s was set to 10.15, 36.5, and 95
for the buyer-seller ratios of 1=2, 2, and 5, respectively. Note that the value of ￿s is nega-
tively related to the number of sellers in the economy because the amount of non-monetary
consumption (per-seller) must increase. All other parameter values and functional forms are
identical to the benchmark case.
The results for prices and welfare are reported in Table 2. Prices are decreasing in the
buyer-seller ratio. Increasing the buyer-seller ratio implies that all agents face a higher
probability of becoming a buyer next period. This increased probability of needing money
balances induces buyers to hold onto more of their present money holdings for next period,
as well as induces sellers to acquire additional money holdings. This increase in supply and
decrease in demand deliver the decline in the prices.
With respect to the welfare e⁄ects of higher in￿ ation, Table 2 indicates nonlinear e⁄ects
of increasing the buyer-seller ratio. For buyer-seller ratios greater than or equal to 0.5, the
welfare costs of in￿ ation are increasing in the ratio. Similar to the decline in prices, this is
due to agents holding onto more money holdings for future consumption. Positive in￿ ation
becomes more costly when agents hold onto larger money balances.
The table indicates that this story can also work the other way. In particular, in￿ ation
can also be costly when there is a very small probability of becoming a buyer. The ￿rst
16two columns of the table shows the price and welfare results under a buyer-seller ratio of
0.0154, which is pinned down by setting ￿s = 1. This ratio implies that the market is over
98 percent sellers who are holding money balances which they will rarely need. Therefore,
in￿ ation becomes costly because the value of their present money balances will decline by a
large amount before they ￿nd it worthwhile to use them. In particular, an agent under 10
percent in￿ ation relative to zero percent would su⁄er a cost of roughly 1.306 percent of total
consumption.
The monetary distributions of the model under various buyer-seller ratios are illustrated
in Figure 3. Three shared characteristics emerge from these distributions. First, every
distribution has a large right tail indicating how many sellers are in the market at any given
time. Second, each seller￿ s money balances are increasing in the buyer-seller ratio. Third,
the number of remaining mass points of the distribution is increasing in the buyer-seller
ratio. While the ￿rst characteristic is similar to the benchmark case and due to the linear
labor assumption, the other two characteristics are due to the relationship between the
buyer-seller ratio and next period￿ s probability of becoming a buyer. The higher an agent￿ s
chance of being a buyer next period, the more likely that agent will spend less when she is
presently a buyer. Spending less money each successive time delivers more mass points in
the distribution.
Since di⁄erent buyer-seller ratios deliver di⁄erent monetary distributions, this section
concludes by comparing them with an empirical proxy of the distribution in the US. Following
Chiu and Molico (2009), a distribution of checking account balances can be constructed
using data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance. The 10th and 90th percentiles of
this distribution are reported in Table 3 along with the same percentiles of the models when
￿ is 2 percent. The table suggests that as the buyer-seller ratio increases, moments of the
simulated monetary distribution approach moments of the empirical distribution. While
this comparison is coarse, it is interesting to note that the data compares more favorably to
buyer-seller ratios which deliver larger welfare costs of in￿ ation.
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Figure 3: Monetary distributions under zero percent in￿ ation; variable buyer-seller ratio.
18Table 2: Price and welfare results for variable buyer-seller ratios
￿ B=S ￿ 0:0154 B=S ￿ 0:5 B=S = 1:0 B=S ￿ 2:0 B=S ￿ 5:0
(% ann.) P W P W P W P W P W
0:0 3.615 0 0.559 0 0.388 0 0.275 0 0.188 0
0:5 3.980 0.102 0.604 0.049 0.423 0.055 0.309 0.063 0.221 0.071
1:0 4.297 0.199 0.643 0.109 0.458 0.115 0.338 0.138 0.251 0.147
2:0 5.081 0.374 0.719 0.210 0.524 0.232 0.395 0.261 0.308 0.299
5:0 7.164 0.791 0.920 0.470 0.696 0.508 0.560 0.595 0.477 0.698
10:0 10.633 1.306 1.241 0.862 0.974 0.924 0.824 1.049 0.764 1.231
Table 3: Empirical distributions of money holdings
Percentile Dataa B=S ￿ 0:0154b B=S ￿ 0:5b B=S = 1:0b B=S ￿ 2:0b B=S ￿ 5:0b
10th 0:00 1.0154 0.244 0:262 0.226 0.055
90th 1:90 1.0154 1.255 1:376 1.545 1.930
90th-10th 1:90 0.000 1.011 1:114 1.319 1.875
Notes: aChecking acct. balances from 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
bModel simulations using ￿ = 2% ann.
3.3.3. Persistent States of Buying and Selling
This section considers persistent types. It is assumed that the probability for an agent to
remain her present type is equal across types (i.e. ￿ (eje) = ￿; 8e 2 E). Having symmetric
degrees of persistence results in the stationary distribution of agents across buyers and sellers
to be equal for all ￿:15 Therefore, the buyer-seller ratio will be equal to one and the results
can be compared to the benchmark economy.
Three degrees of persistence are considered (￿ (eje) = 0:25; 0:75; and 0:90): As with vari-
able buyer-seller ratios, the parameter ￿s is re-calibrated to match velocity. For ￿ (eje) =
0:25; 0:75; and 0:90; ￿s is calibrated to 12:75; 25:5; and 27:3; respectively. All other para-
meter values and functional forms are identical to the benchmark case.
Allowing for persistent types implies that agents are now heterogeneous with respect
to both their individual money holdings and their probability of becoming a type e agent
15Let ￿e denote the stationary fraction of the population in state e: It can be shown that
￿e =
1 ￿ ￿ (eje)
2 ￿ ￿ (eje) ￿ ￿ (~ ej~ e)
; for e 6= ~ e:
Symmetry (￿ (eje) = ￿ (~ ej~ e)) results in ￿e = 1=2:
19next period. In order to calculate expected welfare across agents, the welfare of each type
of agent is weighted by the fraction of the population within that type. Since the Markov
transition matrix is symmetric by assumption, the expected welfare in an environment with
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. Note that when ￿ = 1=2; this welfare calculation
collapses to (7). Calculating the change in welfare given ￿ > 0 is analogous to (8).
The market price and welfare costs across degrees of persistence are reported in Table 4.
As in all previous cases, prices are increasing in the in￿ ation rate and welfare is decreasing for
any given degree of persistence. Comparing the results across degrees of persistence, however,
becomes slightly more complicated. There is a non-monotonic response of the market price
across degrees of persistence. For example, prices are generally decreasing in the degree
of persistence for relatively low levels of in￿ ation (2 percent or lower). At higher rates of
in￿ ation, prices are decreasing up to a persistence level of 0:75 but increasing afterwards.
The reason for this result is due to the model being calibrated under two percent in￿ ation.
As in all previous exercises, there is a positive relationship between market price and velocity.
The relationship between monetary velocity and the money growth rate for all four degrees
of persistence, however, are illustrated in Figure 4. Holding money growth ￿xed, velocity is
decreasing in persistence up to two percent money growth, and increasing afterward. This
suggests that the relationship between money growth and velocity is steeper as persistence
gets larger, and this increase in velocity eventually delivers an increase in market price.
Welfare costs of in￿ ation across degrees of persistence are more straightforward in that
lower degrees of persistence are associated with higher welfare costs. For example, going from
2010 percent in￿ ation to 0 percent is worth 2.169 percent of consumption when the probability
of an agent remaining in her present state 25 percent. This cost is more than twice the
benchmark case. When persistence is larger than the benchmark case, however, the welfare
costs of in￿ ation become welfare gains. In particular, when ￿ (eje) = 0:75; welfare gains
reach a maximum at an in￿ ation rate between 5 and 10 percent. When ￿ (eje) = 0:90;
welfare gains continue past 10 percent in￿ ation, but begin to diminish when ￿ = 12:5:16
To shed some light on these results, welfare is decomposed among buyers and sellers and
reported in Table 5. Explicitly, each component of the ratio in (9) is considered separately
and the welfare cost / bene￿t for buyers and sellers are calculated independently. For all
degrees of persistence, the welfare cost of in￿ ation for sellers is higher than buyers because
they are the agents presently accepting the asset which is depreciating in value. When the
degree of persistence is larger than 50 percent, the table indicates that buyers are receiving
the welfare gains of higher in￿ ation while sellers continue to receive welfare costs. Sellers
repeatedly have money holdings greater than average and therefore view in￿ ation as tax.
Buyers, on the other hand, repeatedly spend portions of their money holdings, have less
than average, and view in￿ ation as a subsidy. The total welfare e⁄ects are roughly an
average of the two independent welfare e⁄ects and illustrate the trade o⁄ between the two
types of agents. When ￿ (bjb) = 0:75 for example, a maximum in total welfare is achieved
around ￿ = 5:0 because the increased costs to sellers eventually overpowers the increased
bene￿ts to buyers.
The monetary distributions are illustrated in Figure 5. For each degree of persistence, 50
percent of the agents are sellers which again explains the large right-tail. As states become
more persistent, the distribution of buyers￿money holdings is ￿ atter and less segmented
because they are spending less of their money holdings each period.
16When ￿ = 12:5; the model predicts P = 1:461 and W = 1:953:

























Figure 4: Annual velocity and money growth for persistent type-shocks.




























































































Figure 5: Monetary distributions under zero percent in￿ ation; variable shock persistence.
23Table 4: Numerical results for persistent type shocks
￿ ￿ (bjb) = 0:25 ￿ (bjb) = 0:50 ￿ (bjb) = 0:75 ￿ (bjb) = 0:90
(% ann.) P W P W P W P W
0:0 0.619 0 0.388 0 0.249 0 0.189 0
0:5 0.660 0.160 0.423 0.055 0.286 -0.063 0.235 -0.393
1:0 0.696 0.304 0.458 0.115 0.319 -0.114 0.277 -0.688
2:0 0.767 0.579 0.524 0.232 0.383 -0.191 0.361 -1.121
5:0 0.956 1.286 0.696 0.508 0.578 -0.299 0.635 -1.768
10:0 1.223 2.169 0.974 0.924 0.913 -0.282 1.169 -1.990
Table 5: Welfare decomposition for persistent type shocks
￿ ￿ (bjb) = 0:25 ￿ (bjb) = 0:50 ￿ (bjb) = 0:75 ￿ (bjb) = 0:90
(% ann.) Wb Ws Wb Ws Wb Ws Wb Ws
0:0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0:5 0.108 0.213 0.057 0.059 -0.133 0.003 -0.899 0.003
1:0 0.207 0.404 0.117 0.122 -0.248 0.012 -1.591 0.022
2:0 0.411 0.750 0.231 0.241 -0.433 0.036 -2.636 0.076
5:0 0.933 1.648 0.508 0.519 -0.783 0.155 -4.377 0.314
10:0 1.645 2.707 0.924 0.939 -1.020 0.412 -5.395 0.749
3.4. Additional Analyses
3.4.1. Quarterly and Monthly Frequencies
The model can just as easily be analyzed in higher frequencies. The results of the
benchmark case (no persistence, ￿ = 1=2) for quarterly and monthly frequencies are reported
in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. The parameter ￿s was calibrated to 8:2 so quarterly velocity
was roughly 1:25 at two percent money growth, and 3:4 so monthly velocity was roughly
0:42: The results discussed above generally hold for all frequencies considered: market price,
the dispersion of money holdings, and monetary velocity are all increasing in the in￿ ation
rate, while the average amount consumed by buyers and welfare are decreasing.
3.4.2. Nonlinear Labor Preferences
Although the benchmark case considered linear labor preferences similar to Lagos and
Wright, the model can just as easily be studied assuming nonlinear preferences with respect
24Table 6: Numerical results for benchmark economy, Quarterly Frequency
￿ (% ann.) P std(m) Velocity E (xb) E (xs) Welfare (%)
0 0.232 0.273 1.058 0.913 8.20 0
0:5 0.244 0.283 1.111 0.905 8.20 0.038
1:0 0.255 0.292 1.161 0.897 8.20 0.076
2:0 0.277 0.308 1.256 0.883 8.20 0.150
5:0 0.331 0.345 1.500 0.848 8.20 0.344
10:0 0.407 0.390 1.832 0.800 8.20 0.629
Table 7: Numerical results for benchmark economy, Monthly Frequency
￿ (% ann.) P std(m) Velocity E (xb) E (xs) Welfare (%)
0 0.172 0.222 0.376 0.961 3.40 0
0:5 0.178 0.228 0.388 0.958 3.40 0.027
1:0 0.183 0.233 0.399 0.954 3.40 0.053
2:0 0.193 0.242 0.420 0.948 3.40 0.104
5:0 0.219 0.265 0.473 0.930 3.40 0.247
10:0 0.255 0.294 0.549 0.904 3.40 0.488
to labor. Consider the utility function








With Cs = 1; ￿ represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. To be consistent with the
exercises above, no attempt is made to calibrate this parameter. Instead, ￿ is set to 0.5 and
￿s is calibrated to 16:7 to match velocity. Having a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 follows Molico
and Chiu (2009) and is consistent with empirical micro measures.17
The results of the model under zero percent in￿ ation are illustrated in Figure 6. Com-
pared to the benchmark case with linear labor, the obvious di⁄erence is that sellers are no
longer choosing their consumption and future money holdings independently of their present
money holdings due to the increasing marginal costs of production. Another result of non-
linear labor preferences is that the production of type b agents becomes positive, but still
remains small. Finally, the more dispersed decisions of the sellers delivers a distribution that
17One technical detail with convex labor preferences is that the marginal costs are lower than linear
preferences for values less than one. Therefore, buyers are more willing to produce and the cost parameter
Cb was increased to 1:0e6:

























































































































Figure 6: Economy with non-linear labor preferences under zero percent in￿ ation.
has a similar shape to the benchmark case, but the nonlinearity results in less segmentation.
Figure 7 illustrates further that although the distributions are less segmented, increases in
the in￿ ation rate make the distribution more dispersed just like the benchmark case.
Finally, the numerical results for the model are presented in Table 8. While nonlinear
labor has large e⁄ects on prices and the average consumption of each agent type, there is
surprisingly little change in the welfare costs. For example, the cost of 10 percent in￿ ation
is worth 0:948 percent of consumption in this model compared to 0:924 percent in the
benchmark case.






























































































Figure 7: Monetary distributions for economy with non-linear labor preferences; variable
in￿ ation rates.
27Table 8: Numerical results for benchmark economy, Nonlinear Labor Preferences
￿ (% ann.) P std(m) Velocity E (xb) E (xs) Welfare (%)
0 2.986 0.410 3.873 0.114 2.483 0
0:5 3.222 0.426 4.178 0.112 2.484 0.060
1:0 3.455 0.441 4.478 0.109 2.486 0.119
2:0 3.903 0.469 5.056 0.106 2.489 0.229
5:0 5.197 0.539 6.724 0.096 2.495 0.533
10:0 7.213 0.624 9.317 0.084 2.503 0.948
4. Conclusion
This paper quantitatively studies an environment where money is essential, and agents
exchange in a Walrasian market with a competitively-determined price. All agents consume
and can produce a homogeneous good, but hold money balances to purchase consumption in
the event that they receive a low productivity shock. The model is calibrated to match long-
run US velocity, and the welfare costs of in￿ ation are assessed for variable buyer-seller ratios
as well as persistent states of buying and selling. The welfare results can be summarized
as generally increasing in the number of buyers relative to sellers, and decreasing in the
persistence in the states of buying and selling. When states become more persistent that 50
percent, those who are persistently buyers receive welfare gains of in￿ ation while those who
are persistently sellers receive welfare costs. Further calculations of the model show that
it is possible to obtain similar results for varying model frequencies as well as alternative
(non-linear) labor preferences.
These results raise a number of compelling extensions. First, ￿nding the relevant empiri-
cal moments to pin down a buyer-seller ratio, degree of type persistence, and shape of labor
preferences will be very important for policy analysis. The model could then be used in a
way similar to Lucas (2000) to deliver welfare costs of in￿ ation which would be more reliable
than the ones considered here. Second, given the relevant ease with which this model can
be computed, it seems a reasonable environment to extend with additional assets similar to
Aruoba et al. (2007), or a labor market similar to Berentsen et al. (2008). Finally, the most
28immediate extension of the present analysis is to consider the welfare e⁄ects of in￿ ation in a
dynamic setting similar to Krusell and Smith￿ s (1998) analysis of the business cycle. These
extensions are currently being explored.
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